



## Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).

desk room. I am glad to learn that a resolution is to be introduced into the House early in the coming session, calling for a detailed statement of every dollar paid, directly or indirectly, to every army officer who has been on duty here during the year drawing to a close. This will show that the only necessity for a new War Department is to provide a costly hive for these martial drones."

**AVONDALE AND WAR.**—The sympathy awakened by the disaster at Avondale does honor to humanity, and suggests a contrast in the opposite treatment of sufferers from war. About one hundred men perished in an hour at Avondale, leaving 73 widows and 156 orphans, in all, 229, to want; and already the sum of \$250,000 is said to have been spontaneously raised for their relief.

But the victims in war are a hundred, if not a thousand, fold more numerous; but when or where do we find a like response to their claims upon public sympathy and relief? Nobody thinks of it. At the rate of the Avondale charity, the sufferers from our rebellion, for instance, would require about \$1,250,000,000, or nearly half as much as our war debt. Yet even this enormous sum would be a very poor pecuniary compensation for the million able-bodied men, North and South, killed or crippled for life by that long, gigantic conflict. But for these millions of sufferers from that rebellion, how little is now thought by the public at large.

**SOUTHERN TAXATION.**—The South very naturally complain of this; but the Charleston (S. C.) *Republican* thus puts the case:—"Some men are quite fond of comparing present rates of taxation with those before the war. But suppose the South had been victorious, and succeeded in establishing such a government as they desired. How much better off would the people be to-day? First of all, there would be the immense Confederate debt to pay. Most of this would have become payable six months after the ratification of peace with the United States. This of itself would have drained the country of its last cent, and to the people, already impoverished by the war, would have been presented the choice of repudiation or starvation. The former would no doubt have been the result. In the second place, there would be a large floating debt and currency (since repudiated) to be redeemed by each separate State; more than enough in itself to drive the people to starvation. In the third place, there would be, not only a State government in which an army of disbanded officers would all claim a place, but a general government, costing as much as the present one, the expenses of which would have to be borne by thirteen States instead of thirty-seven."

**PACIFIC REVOLUTION IN FRANCE.**—"One of the most interesting features of the present elections is the new tendency of the youth of the upper classes in France. Six years ago (1863) many illusions and many traditional ideas were still in force, and the mode of life that a man foresaw in the immediate future was very different from what it is now. Let us take a young man of eighteen or nineteen, and one of twenty-four, six years ago. Suppose he belongs to the family of a country gentleman with limited fortune, but some standing in his department. If he is 18 or 19, he is thinking for his future of one of three things only—either of going into the army, or of getting named by some special favor in the ranks of the Conseil d'Etat; or (and this is the far most numerous class) of doing nothing at all, and getting by some influence or lucky chance, a rich wife, chosen from the low-born rich who have sprung up under the Empire. Six years ago these were the three 'modes of life' looked forward to by men under twenty and by their families. Of political life there was no notion; that was tacitly left to those 'who were used to it,' above all, to the dwellers in towns, and to writers, professors, &c. So far, the men under twenty; but the men just under the legal age of twenty-five were, if anything, still more without ambition or desire for public activity. If already married, they were looking forward, at the utmost, to some improvement in agriculture as a means of occupying their years beneficially; and if not yet married, they were

planning how they should soonest attain to that excellent consummation. If in the army, they were losing their time in provincial garrisons, and waiting for the moment of national glory, destined to prove that, for well-born gentlemen, the military career was the only career left in France.

"All this is altered now; and for those who know France and the various sections of her society well, there has been no greater change at any period of her history. This change has come very suddenly; but it is most important, for it has come with the absolute certainty that war is impossible. Even a year ago this was a subject for discussion. Would or could anything bring about a war? Might some 'hasard' all at once, as in the past, set fire to the powder that was lying about everywhere? There was no reasonable cause for war; but still would it not suddenly break out; and, once plunged into, of course France would show herself the military nation she had always been, and the entire country would associate itself passionately with the fortunes of the army. It is this which is destroyed—all this. No 'hasard' can possibly set fire to the powder that impious hands have strewn about. War will not suddenly 'break out,' because no one will dare to help in such a work; and, if it did, France would not show herself enthusiastic at all, but just the reverse, and the 'entire country' would array itself resolutely against whosoever tried to force or entrap it into a war. The military effervescence of other days is gone, and this race of men who are beginning to think out democratic problems, and to coalesce in what they believe to be common interests, will resist absolutely any attempt to convert them into *chair à canon*.

"War, as a 'way out,' is now forbidden Napoleon III., and he knows it. It is a worn-out remedy, and no longer applies. The time is gone by for it. But this, while it hems the Emperor and his government into a much narrower circle than ever before, precisely enlarges the sphere of activity for the young men of the upper classes. It will ere long be ridiculous to make a soldier of a *fils de famille*; and this forces him to regard politics as a field for competition. The consequence is that the men over 25 have this time thrown themselves into the electoral contest with real ardor, and the lads under 20 follow on all but passionately. This is an utterly novel state of things in France, and certainly not to be foreseen even two years ago. But there it is now, and it brings with it a mental condition which those who are trying to govern France must reckon with. Even women grow political now, and the merits of the various candidates are discussed with a shade more of tolerance and fairness than one could ever have supposed possible.

"A curious point to observe in all this is the position of the clergy. The priest in France, unless he belong to the very superior portion of the body-ecclesiastical, is mostly military-minded. War is a thing he takes in easily; it enters into those ways of government which his mind thoroughly understands; and of all methods of preventing a man from too much or too deep thinking, none seems simpler or more generally successful than devoting him to drill and glory. This sudden change in the French temper, perplexes the mass of the clergy sorely; and assuredly, the Revolution of 1848, toppling over thrones as it did, frightened the clerical mind far less from its propriety than do the strange theories propounded now on all sides about universal peace, education, the relations between capital and labor, and the unrestricted exchange between all nations of whatsoever each can produce most naturally, and at the smallest cost. These are the questions that trouble and perplex the priest in every country; and these are beginning to attract the attention of the youthful minds consigned to his care.

"What is to be done? It is a very complicated case. War, I repeat, as a 'way out,' is now an impossibility, which is an immense gain, but at present a negative gain. There will be no war. Of that thinking men here are now perfectly certain; but if the war-ghost is to go on haunting France and Europe long after the actual demise of war itself, only half the good is achieved. When will be first pronounced the great word 'disarmament,' and who will utter it? It is the next step, who will take it? Probably for some years France would go on wasting money on useless armaments. Prussia would say she dared not be the first to disarm. Who knows whether Austria, long so sorely tried, may not be the first to speak the word of which every other country feels the necessity."—*Cor. of London News*.